Give Bilić Time, But Test the Right Things

Slaven Bilić and the players need to have a hard, long look in the mirror today. Last night’s 7-0 defeat to England in Rijeka was the worst night in Croatian national team history; not even the 6-0 loss to Spain in Elche in 2018 was this bad. At least back then we could’ve taken the lead, and we were equal in the first 20 minutes, while against England at no point did we look like their equals.

The numbers say the same thing we saw on the pitch. England had 12 big chances and ten shots on target; we had one of each. Their xG was over six, ours 1.39, and we only had 36% of the ball. I could list twenty more stats like these, but you don’t need them. There was no single mistake or lost duel you could point to, and no moment where the game could’ve turned. It was a flood from start to finish. But we need to move on, as we face Spain again on Tuesday in Split, and several of Bilić’s choices have clearly failed and need changing as soon as possible.

Before the pitchforks come out, remember what he inherited: a slow team, short on ideas and very inconsistent at the back. Dalić’s last two tournaments weren’t good, and plenty of the games in between weren’t either. We all saw it and complained about it numerous times. The back line tells the story best. In the 27 games since EURO 2024, Dalić used 18 different defensive combinations. We kept eight clean sheets, five of them against Gibraltar, Montenegro, the Faroe Islands and Panama, and none at the EURO. Gvardiol and Vušković shared the pitch just three times. And apart from France in the Nations League QF first leg at Poljud, we didn’t beat a top side in that whole stretch.

So no, one 7-0 shouldn’t cost Bilić his job. But being patient with him doesn’t mean the plan is above criticism, and there’s plenty to criticise.

The Defence: No Leaders

Let’s start with the glaring issue we’ve had this entire year, not just under Slaven: the defence. On paper it’s all good: Stanišić is a regular at Bayern, Gvardiol is at City, Vušković has started well with Brighton, and at left-back we have to make do with Perišić.

Let’s first touch on Gvardiol. At City, he plays at left-back and has the freedom to go into attack. Now Bilić has brought him back into a more central role in a partnership with Vušković, which should be the way going forward despite how utterly bad it looks right now. Both of them need a leader, or “communicator” is probably a better word: somebody who will set them up to be in the right place at the right time with their experience, as right now they both lack experience at the position. Vušković lacks it because he’s young, and Joško because he hasn’t been a natural centre-back since moving to England. If we had a Dejan Lovren right now, that would be perfect. Gvardiol could play at left-back, and we could let Vušković and Lovren do their jobs, with the more experienced Premier League-winning centre-back teaching the Hajduk product in real time. As we, for example, had in Qatar with Lovren and Joško himself.

Sadly, we have no leaders in the defence as of now, so we have to rely on them becoming ones themselves. Šutalo, Pongračić, Erlić and Ćaleta-Car don’t have the quality or experience to do that job.

What Bilić can’t do is give up on the pair after one bad night. Two young centre-backs don’t click by being rotated out every time things go wrong. They click by playing together, making mistakes together and fixing them together. He picked them as the future, and I’d keep them in against Spain even if it hurts. Let Šutalo get his minutes as well, but not at the cost of the pairing.

The next best solution to a leader is a natural 6 in front of them to help out cover the defense.

Midfield: One of Kova and Modrić Has to Go

A natural 6 was something we badly needed against England, as Kane would often drop into the space between the pivot of Kovačić and Modrić and the last line to receive the ball and create from there. Nor did Vušković or Gvardiol step up to mark him, leaving Kane to do his thing. Which is probably the worst thing you could do.

Now let’s move to Kovačić and the eternal flame that is Luka Modrić. Both are amazing players, even now in 2026, but neither is a six. Modrić dictates the tempo, and Kovačić carries the ball through midfield; they’re at their best on the ball, not shielding the back four. Even in their prime, they couldn’t be a pivot in a 4-2-3-1, which is why Dalić put Marcelo Brozović behind them in a 4-3-3. That worked because Brozović did the dirty work. He held his position, covered the ground the other two left, and kept the space in front of the centre-backs closed, which let Kovačić carry and Modrić control the game without worrying about what was behind them.

Without a Brozović, the two of them end up in the same area, and the gap between them and the back four opens up. If one steps out to press, the other can’t cover alone, and the centre-backs are left with nobody in front of them. England’s attackers lived in that gap all night, and every time the ball reached them, Vušković and Gvardiol had to decide whether to step out or drop, with no midfield help either way. Against smaller sides, that space doesn’t get punished as often.

Bilić’s high line at Rujevica made it worse, as a line that high needs a midfield close enough to compress the space, and ours wasn’t. But the gap would have hurt us whatever height we defended at, as the real issue is the missing shield, not just the line. I’m not saying a six type would’ve turned 0-7 into a draw, or even a narrow loss. England had far too much quality for that. But it would’ve helped. The gap would’ve been smaller, the centre-backs would’ve had cover. It’s something we need to think about rather than playing Kovačić-Modrić and hoping for the best.

If Bilić continues with a 4-2-3-1 in matches where we’re not favourites, we need a six: Mišić or Nejašmić, if he gets called up in the future. Mišić did get his chance in Seville and we lost 4-1, but one game against the world champions doesn’t settle whether the idea works. The alternative is a switch to a 4-3-3 with the same six and then Kova or Modrić next to Petar Sučić, who can do the running part of the job whilst leaving the playmaking to his midfield partners.

The Number 10 Problem

Now, to touch on the Inter midfielder: Bilić has played Petar Sučić higher than the double pivot in all three matches so far, leaning towards the right-hand side in possession when Kovačić moves up. It doesn’t take much to see that Sučić isn’t a great fit for that role. It makes even less sense when you see the names in the squad who are natural in that position: Vlašić, Majer, Luka Sučić, and Baturina, who was used on the left in last night’s match.

I really hope Bilić drops this idea of the midfield, as we don’t gain anything for the upcoming EURO from a pivot of Kovačić and Modrić with Petar Sučić in front of them. Even if they perform OK against the sides we’re favourites against, as they did against Czechia, we still can and should do a lot better when shaping our midfield for the future. Against teams with similar or better quality than ours, that duo pivot will always struggle. We need to sacrifice one of the two, and it makes more sense for it to be Modrić. Not because he’s not capable of playing at this level; he still can. But his consistency isn’t getting any better, and to be frank, this would be the perfect time to start the transition of our midfield with the help of Modrić whilst he’s still in the squad. And it’s not like he won’t be used; he can still help out in the closing minutes of a match when he’s fresh.

The Wings

Baturina on the left wing with Perišić behind him is an ok combo in my book. The Como attacking midfielder is used to that role by now and will seemingly be playing it for the foreseeable future at club level, as long as Nico Paz remains in Italy. The issues with Perišić at left-back come from the midfield setup and a defence that isn’t up to play a high line against top teams with pace. I like the setup only because we have no real other options in the squad right now; it’s the most “natural” play for our left-hand side.

On the right wing, we saw Franjo Ivanović play. I thought that after his poor performance against Czechia, Bilić had had enough of that idea, but apparently not. Now he forced him onto the right side, where nothing changed. The Lens striker doesn’t have the 1v1 dribbling ability to consistently beat average defenders, let alone the fourth-ranked team in the world, who also took bronze at the World Cup. Ivanović can only play as a striker or behind the striker; he’s not that dissimilar to Andrej Kramarić, who was also pushed out wide many times, to rare avail. Both are much better used next to or behind another striker.

Trial the Right Positions

After the game, Bilić said he’d treated this Nations League as a trial, a way to find some answers, and that they got some, just not the ones he wanted. Fine, and Dalić used these games the same way. But if it’s a trial, it has to ask the right questions.

We learned the first answer the hard way: where we stand against the world’s best right now. And that’s nowhere near them. 11 goals conceded in two games against the World Champions and the Bronze medalists. The answer that matters more is what we learn and do about it. We already know what Modrić and Perišić bring to the squad. We already know that dragging strikers and attacking midfielders out to the wing gets us nowhere. We already know that an exposed pair of centre-backs gets punished by the top sides. Seeing it all again for four games tells us nothing new.

What we don’t know is who plays left-back and on the right wing at EURO 2028, and those are exactly the slots where Bilić has to run trials. Take left-back, for example. Perišić is 37, and he won’t improve because Bukayo Saka had a field day against him. A young full-back like Šimun Hrgović thrown in against that would probably have a nightmare performance as well, but afterwards he’d know something he didn’t know before, and so would Bilić. Hrgović can improve from that shocking performance, whilst Perišić won’t be doing any improving.

There’s a fair argument for why we didn’t use this window for those two positions: the U21s were finishing their own EURO qualifying, Olić’s team had work to do, and their great results and qualification deserve respect. In November, though, that excuse is gone. We need to test those players, especially Hrgović at left-back, Segečić on the right wing, and Jagušić on both the wing and centrally. We have gaping holes in the squad and no clear fix. Every call-up after this international break should attempt to answer a question about the team Bilić wants for 2028.

The only real trial that Bilić ran this window was the strikers. Hopefully he got his answers, and we’ll see the striker list cut down to three that he was most impressed with next month, opening up space for a Hrgović, a Segečić or a Jagušić.

Spain on Tuesday, and the Road to 2028

The world champions beat us 4-1 in Seville last week, and we won’t beat them with talent and hope. We need a structure that makes them work: compactness, control of the tempo, fouls where they’re needed, a big game from Livaković and good ball retention when we do have it. Something has to keep us in the match to give us a chance for a result.

At the next major tournament, EURO 2028, Luka Modrić will be 42 (turning 43 that September), Perišić 39, Budimir 36, and Kramarić 36 (turning 37 during the tournament).

We need Bilić from his first term: those first few years when we saw the young guys step up and become national team regulars. Apart from Vušković, Baturina and Petar Sučić, we need more new faces in the squad regularly. Bilić needs time, but he needs to use that time correctly and answer the questions that have been lingering for a while.